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The Aging Phenomenon and Insurance Prices
Abstract
Insurers typically earn greater profits on policies that have been
with the insurer for a number of renewal cycles than on newer busi-
ness. This tendency is known as the aging phenomenon and is believed
to occur on all lines of business. Although the aging phenomenon is
common knowledge, no mathematical methods for incorporating this
phenomenon into pricing decisions have been documented. This paper
sets forth a procedure for determining the maximum acceptable loss
ratio on new business that will be profitable for the insurer over its
entire renewal cycle by incorporating a discounted cash flow analysis
of future profits. The advantages of measuring profitability by
cohorts of business; depending on when the policy was originally
written, are also demonstrated.

Section 1 - Introduction
A well known but little documented tendency of property-liability
insurance contracts is for the loss ratio on mature business, the book
of policies that has been with the insurer for a number of renewal
cycles, to exhibit constant improvement. The cause of this tendency,
termed the aging phenomenon or seasoning of business, has been
addressed by Kunreuther and Pauly [5] and D'Arcy and Doherty [4] and
theorized to be the result of the accumulation of private information
by the contracting insurer. This information allows the insurer to
classify the policyholders properly as valid information about the
risk is collected, as opposed to the initial information included in
the application and obtained in the initial underwriting screening.
Such information could include a verified loss history, as the insurer
knows about claims that occur during the coverage period, the condi-
tion of the insured property and the degree of cooperation demon-
strated by the insured in settling any claims. This insurer also is
able to renew policies selectively to weed out the least desirable
risks. The remaining policyholders represent a continually improving
book of business as more high-risk insureds are properly classified
and appropriately charged and the culling process continues to cancel
policyholders whose risk profile is higher than the indicated rate
level would reflect. For example, a private passenger automobile
insured with one at-fault accident may have proven to be such an
uncooperative defense witness that the insurer is unwilling to renew
the policy even at the classification rate for one accident. As the
contracting insurer has an advantage in access to this information,
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competition does not work to reduce the premium level on this desir-
able business in proportion to the improvement in loss experience.
The aging phenomenon is believed to occur for all lines of
property-liability insurance, although little published information
confirms this belief. Eight insurers have provided the authors with
confidential information demonstrating this effect, subject to the
condition that they not be identified, and many other insurers have
confirmed that the trend also occurs on their business as well. The
disparity of record keeping techniques and internal procedures among
insurers makes exact measurement of the extent of aging impossible at
this point. However, the widespread confirmation of this trend and
its importance in pricing and marketing strategy calls for an analysis
of the effect of aging on insurance pricing.
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate the aging phenomenon
into a pricing model. The initial model is based on fairly simple
assumptions in order to demonstrate the effect of aging on prices
clearly and to derive numerical results. The assumptions are later
altered to reflect more realistic conditions in additional models.
Hopefully, individuals with access to their company's databases will
be encouraged to generate additional tests of these models.
Section 2 - Notation
The following notation will be used in the initial model:
P = premium level per policy
E = expenses per policy other than loss adjustment expenses
ER = expense ratio (E/P)
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L = losses and loss adjustment expenses (LAE) per policy
discounted to correspond to the receipt of premium
LR = loss and loss adjustment expense ratio (discounted) (L/P)
A = aging factor (rate of improvement in losses and loss
adjustment expenses per policy as the book of business
ages)
W = renewal rate (percentage of current period's policies
renewed in the subsequent period)
F = profit per policy on business originally written in the
first period
1 = risk adjusted interest rate used to discount profits
earned in each period
j = subscript to indicate the age of the book of business
In the first period, the insurer writes a book of new business and
on that book would earn a profit on each policy of:
F
l *
P
l "
E
l
" L
l
(1)
This profit is not the traditional underwriting profit, because
investment income is reflected by the use of discounted losses and
loss adjustment expenses. Also, it is not the traditional operating
profit, as the investment income that is reflected is not the amount
earned in the current period, as the operating profit represents, but
the future investment income that can be attributed to the time lag
between the receipt of premium and the payment of claims. This profit
can be viewed as a composite profit that reflects both underwriting
experience and the time value of money. Determining the proper
discount rate to apply to the losses will be discussed more fully in
Section 4.
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In the second period, the insurer would write some new business
and some renewal business, but this study will concentrate on the
renewal business only since the purpose of this paper is to examine
the profitability of one cohort of business as it ages for the
insurer. In the second period, the business originally written in the
first period would generate a profit of:
F
2
= Wl (P 2 - E 2 - L 2 ) (2)
The present value (as of the beginning of the first period) of the
second period's profit is:
PV(F
2
) = W
1
(P
2
- E
2
- L
2
)/(l + I) (3)
The present value of the third period's profit is, similarly:
PV(F
3
) = (W
1
)(W
2
)(P
3
- E
3
- L
3
)/(l + I) 2 (4)
The profits and present value of profits can continue to be
calculated in this manner until no business is left to renew.
Theoretically, this could continue infinitely, although for any
personal lines coverage the mortality of the insured would place an
upper limit on the number of renewal periods.
Section 3 - Model 1
In the first model, certain simplifying assumptions are made.
First, the premium level per policy in each period is the same (P = P.
for j = 1, n) . The insurer does not raise the premium level over time
and also does not provide discounts to long-term insureds. Second,
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the expenses are constant over time (E = E. for j = 1, n) . The cost
of writing new business is the same as renewal business. Next, the
proportion of policies renewed each year is the same (W = W. for
j = 1, n) . Finally, the improvement in the losses and loss adjustment
expenses per policy is constant for each renewal period (A = L. . /L
.
,
for j = 1 , n-1).
Under these simplifying assumptions, the present value of the
profit stream becomes:
00
PV(F) = Z [(Wj
~
L )(P - E - Aj
" 1 (L)]/(l + I) j-1 (5)
j = l
This equation indicates that the insurer is concerned with
achieving an adequate profit on a cohort of business over time. New
business, although it may not be profitable to the insurer initially,
must produce an adequate profit, considering its first terra and future
renewal cycles with the insurer, in order to justify the insurer's
writing it at all. As the losses per policy decline each renewal
period, while premiums and expenses are constant, the profitability of
each policy renewed increases. However, not all policies are renewed.
Some are nonrenewed by the insurer and others at the initiative of the
insured. Regardless of cause, fewer policies are renewed each period.
Also, as these profits will not be earned until subsequent periods, an
appropriate discount factor must be applied to determine the present
value of these future profits. Since the premium level is assumed to
be a constant, it can be factored out of the equation, leading to a
present value of the profit stream per dollar of first period premium
or:
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00
(PV(F))/P = Z [(Wj_1 )(l - ER - Aj
" 1 (LR)]/(l + I) j-1 (6)
j»l
As each policy becomes more profitable in subsequent renewals, two
factors act to reduce the impact of these profits on the present value
of profitability. First, not all policies are renewed, so the
increasingly profitable business is gradually reducing in size.
Secondly, the profits are earned in the future and therefore must be
discounted to the present value. Thus, the renewal factor, W, and the
interest rate used to discount future cash flows, I, are included in
the profitability analysis.
Section 4 - Maximum Initial Loss Ratio
The aging phenomenon encourages insurers to write new business at
a loss in order to gain the opportunity to earn future profits on this
book of business as it subsequently renews. Competition for new
business requires this initial loss ratio to be unprofitable, but the
acceptable level of unprof itability on new business is often difficult
to determine. In this section the maximum initial discounted loss
ratio, termed LR , is calculated. The term loss ratio will be used
for convenience, but this is meant to include loss adjustment
expenses.
In this paper, losses and loss adjustment expenses are assumed to
be discounted at the appropriate rate of interest back to the time
when the premium is written. This adjustment is necessary in order to
reflect the time value of money. A number of different approaches
have been utilized in practice to account for investment income in
insurance pricing. The different approaches are discussed in Cummins
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and Harrington [1], D'Arcy [2], D'Arcy and Doherty [3], and Webb [6].
The techniques proposed include the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the
Arbitrage Pricing Model, the Option Pricing Model and a Discounted
Cash Flow Model. Measuring the appropriate interest rate to use in
discounting cash flows based on each of these models has proven to be
quite difficult based on available data.
One interest rate that has been proposed to discount cash flows is
the one to twelve month U.S. Treasury bill rate, which is termed the
risk, free interest rate. The expected loss and LAE payout pattern can
be discounted based on this rate to determine the actual initial loss
ratio in comparison with the maximum loss ratios determined in this
paper. One other advantage of using discounted loss ratios is the
comparability across coverages and lines. The same discounted loss
ratio will apply to fast settling lines such as collision and compre-
hensive as well as long-tailed lines such as liability, as the
investment income component is directly reflected in the discounted
loss ratio.
This discounted loss ratio, LR l is the level at which the
present value of all profits on the cohort of business over its entire
renewal cycle is zero. New business written at this discounted loss
ratio will generate future profits that will, in present value terms,
only offset the initial losses on the cohort of business. Any higher
initial discounted loss ratio will generate losses for the insurer.
Any lower initial discounted loss ratio will generate profits, in
MAX
total. Thus, LR is the upper limit of the discounted loss ratio
for new business.
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Setting the left-hand side of equation (6) equal to zero and
rearranging terras leads to:
00 00
MAY
j-1 j-1
^ Z (Wj 1 )(ki~ 1 )/a+I)i~ 1 = (1-ER) Z (Wj 1 )/(l+l) j l (7)
Each of the terras in the infinite summations, WA/G+I) and W/(l+I),
is between zero and one, since both W and A are greater than zero but
less than or equal to one and I is greater than zero. Therefore,
equation (7) can be expressed as:
LR
MAX [1/(1-(WA/(1+I)))] = (l-ER)[l/(l-(w7(l+I)))] (3)
or LR^ - [(1+I-WA)/(1+I)][1-ER][(1+I)/(1+I-W)] (9)
or LR^ = [(1+I-WA)/(1 +I-W)][1-ER] (10)
To illustrate the mathematics of equation (10), the following
values will be used:
A (Aging Factor) = 90%
W (Renewal Rate) = 90%
I (Interest Rate) = 10%
ER (Expense Ratio) = 30%
MAX
LR = [.29/. 20] [.70] = 1.015 or 101.5%
This calculation indicates that if the insurer writes new business
at a discounted loss ratio of 101.5%, the initial losses on the
business will eventually be exactly offset, in present value terras, by
future profits as the policies renew at progressively lower loss
ratios. Any higher initial discounted loss ratio will never be, in
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total, profitable. Lower initial discounted loss ratios will produce
a positive profit, although the adequacy of any particular profit
level has not been determined. What is now known is that the insurer
should definitely not write new business if the initial discounted
loss ratio is in excess of 101.5%.
The first twenty-five years of experience on a cohort of
$1,000,000 of new business is illustrated in Table 1. In the first
year of the life of this cohort of business, the insurer incurs a loss
of $315,000 ($ 1,000,000(1-ER-LR)). In the second year, 90 percent of
the initial book of business is renewed, generating a premium volume
of $900,000. The loss ratio improves to 91.4% (.9(101.5)), dropping
the combined ratio to 121.4%. The composite loss is $192,600, but the
present value of this loss is only $175,090 (192,600/1.1). In
subsequent years the premium volume continues to decline, as only 90
percent of the business is renewed each year. The loss ratio also
declines with each renewal. In the fifth year the cohort generates a
composite profit, but the cumulative value of the composite experience
is still negative. By the twenty-fifth year of the cohort, the com-
posite experience is a positive $1,182,000 (sum of column 5). How-
ever, the present value of the composite experience is still a
negative $24,000, as the profits occurring in the later years are
discounted over a longer period than the losses of the early years.
However, continuing the illustration to infinity would generate a sum
of present values that would equal zero, by construction.
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Section 5 - Derivatives
MAX
The effect on LR of changes in the parameters, A, W, I and ER,
MAX
can be determined by taking the partial derivatives of LR in
equation (9) with respect to each value. Equation (9) is used to
determine the derivatives rather than equation (10) to simplify the
illustration of the effect adding a new business expense factor to the
model. (See Section 8.) The derivative with respect to the renewal
rate, W, is:
SLR^/aW = (1+I)(1+(ER)(A)-A-ER)/(1+I-W) 2 (11)
As each of the terms in parentheses is positive, the partial deriva-
tive is positive. Thus, an increase in the renewal rate, W, allows
the insurer to write at a higher initial discounted loss ratio. Note
that in obtaining this derivative, the aging factor is assumed to be
independent of the renewal rate. If a higher renewal rate is obtained
at the cost of increasing the aging factor, then the relationship be-
tween the renewal rate and LR is not clear cut.
The partial derivative of LR 1 with respect to the expense ratio,
ER, is:
3LR
MAX/3ER = -U+I-WA)/(1+I-W) (12)
As each of the terras in parentheses is positive, the partial deriva-
tive is negative. An increase in the expense ratio requires the
initial discounted loss ratio to be lower.
MAX
The partial derivative of LR with respect to the interest rate
used to discount cash flows, I, is:
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BLR^/ai = -(W)(1+(ER)(A)-A-ER)/(1+I-W) 2 (13)
Again, the terras in parentheses are all positive, so the partial
derivative is negative. A higher interest rate lowers the maximum
initial discounted loss ratio. This implies that if interest rates
were to increase, then the loss ratio on new business should be
lowered. However, the loss ratio used in this model is itself dis-
counted, and a higher interest rate would produce a lower discounted
loss ratio from the same payout stream. Thus, it is difficult to
ascertain the effect of a change in interest rates on conventional,
nondiscounted loss ratios. However, the effect on discounted loss
ratios is unequivocal. For a coverage that is settled quickly, such
as comprehensive or collision, a change in the interest rate used to
discount the loss payout pattern would have little effect. In con-
trast, changing the interest rate for determining present values of
composite profits would be significantly affected. For such cover-
ages, the initial loss ratios should decline with increases in inter-
est rates, as future profits will have a smaller impact in offsetting
initial losses. This finding contradicts most other studies on the
effect of investment income on loss ratios, and is based on viewing
profitability on a cohort basis instead of in aggregate.
For example, consider the situation in which there is no lag
between the receipt of premium and the payment of claims so the
discounted loss ratio is equal to the actual loss ratio and, thus,
unaffected by interest rates. Short terra policies with a lag in
collecting premiums (perhaps from an agent or broker) and in which
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insurers can pay losses as soon a they occur (such as automobile
collision or comprehensive) may approach such a situation. Paid loss
retrospective coverage would also have this behavior. As illustrated
in Section 4, for the selected values of the variables, the maximum
loss ratio at which the insurer should write new business is 101.5
percent. If interest rates were to increase from 10 percent to 12
percent, then the maximum loss ratio drops to 98.6 percent
[(l+.12+(.9)(.9))/(l+.12-.9)] [1-.3] . Since the actual and discounted
loss ratios are the same, the insurer has to raise premiums when
interest rates rise. This occurs because the future profits on this
cohort are discounted at a higher interest rate and, thus, have a
reduced impact in offsetting the initial losses incurred on the
cohort.
MAX
The partial derivative of LR with respect to the aging factor,
A, is
SLR^/aA = -(W)(1-ER)/(1+I-W) (14)
This value is also negative as the terras in parentheses are each
positive. An increase in the aging factor, that is as it moves closer
toward one, reduces the maximum initial discounted loss ratio.
MAX
Section 6 - Use of LR
MAX
Once LR is determined, the insurer sets a premium level that
maximizes the profitability of the cohort of business over its life-
time with the insurer. Since LR indicates the highest initial loss
ratio that can be obtained for an insurer to achieve the minimum
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acceptable rate of return over the life of the cohort, then the
initial premium level must be set so the initial loss ratio is less
MAX
than or equal to LR • The premium level that optimizes this long
run profitability depends on the elasticity of demand in this region
of premium levels.
Elasticity of demand is the relationship between the price level
and the quantity of policies sold. Unitary elasticity is defined as
the point at which a marginal price increase is exactly offset by an
equal decrease in the quantity sold, so that the total revenue remains
constant. For example, at an elasticity of one, a 10 percent premium
level increase reduces the quantity of policies sold by 9.1 percent,
so that the total premiums written do not increase. The insurer
collects the same premium income, but with fewer policies each paying
a higher premium per policy. The elasticity of demand of greater than
one is when an increase in the premium level per policy reduces the
quantity of policies sold to a greater extent than the premium
increase, so that total revenue declines. Conversely, inelastic
demand is the range where the elasticity of demand is less than one,
so a premium level increase reduces the quantity of policies sold by a
lesser amount, and therefore the total revenue rises.
MAXIf the elasticity of demand is greater than one at LR , then
the insurer will maximize profits by charging a premium level that is
MAX
equal to 1/LR . This premium level produces a zero profit (based on
the definition of profit explained in Section 2), but the insurer does
achieve a risk adjusted rate of return on the business written. This
return results from the use of the risk adjusted interest rate to
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discount the cash flows from the cohort of business. Any higher
premium level decreases total revenue by more than the reduction in
losses that occurs from writing a smaller book of business.
If the elasticity of demand is less than one at the premium level
that produces an initial loss ratio of LR , then the insurer
maximizes profits by raising the price level until unitary elasticity
is reached. Unfortunately, this is difficult to determine in prac-
tice, because the elasticity of demand function is not known, but must
be estimated. This elasticity is likely to vary by insurer and over
time. In fact, the existence of positive profits, those in excess of
the minimum risk adjusted required rate of return, would most likely
encourage other insurers to compete for this business. New entry
would continue to be encouraged until these profits are eliminated.
The fear of competition for profitable business is one reason that
insurers keep data of the aging phenomenon confidential. Thus, the
optimal premium level, the one that maximizes long run profits, cannot
be determined exactly. However, the upper limit of the initial loss
ratio, LR , can be determined fairly accurately as this depends only
on the expense ratio, renewal ratio, aging factor and the interest
rate.
Section 7 - Fixed Planning Horizon
The examples above assume the insurer is maximizing the present
value of profits derived from a given cohort of business for the
current year and all future years. This infinite time horizon, while
theoretically valid, may not be acceptable in practice. Insurers may
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prefer to determine a premium level that achieves a profit, or at
least avoids a loss, over a set period of time. Equations (5) through
(10) can be rewritten to deal with a fixed planning horizon (indicated
by the subscript n) as follows:
n
'
-l '-1 • -1
PV (F) = I [(WJ
X
)(P - E - AJ (L)]/(l + I) 3 (15)
j-l
(PV (F))/P = Z [(Wj_1 )(l - ER - Aj
" 1 (LR)]/(l + l)j_1 (16)
j = l
LR
^X
E (Wj
" 1 )(Aj
" l )/(l+I) j
" 1
= (1-ER) >: (Wj
" 1 )/(l+I)J
" 1 (17)
" 3=1 J-l
Given a fixed time horizon, this equation reduces to:
LR
n
MAX [(l-(WA/(l+l)) n )/(l-WA/(l+l))]
= (1-ER)[(1-(W/(1+T)) n )/(1-W/(1+1))] (18)
or LR
MAX
= [(l+l-WA)/((l+I) n -(WA) n )]
n
• [((1+I)
n
-W
n )/(1+1-W)][l-ER] (19)
The example calculated earlier is shown in Table 2 for a ten year
horizon. The maximum initial loss ratio declines from 101.5 percent
for an infinite horizon to 92.2 percent for a ten year horizon.
After ten years the sum of the present value of composite profits is
equal to zero. This cohort of business will continue to generate
profits in subsequent renewals, but these were ignored in setting
n
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Section 8 - Model 2
The second model is similar to the first, with constant interest
rates, renewal rates and aging factors, but the expense ratio is
higher on new business than on renewal. This would be the case where
new business requires a one time additional expense incurred when the
new business is written. The expenses on renewals are all the same.
The additional new business expenses per policy will be denoted as X,
and the expenses as a percentage of premium denoted as XR. Including
this additional new business expense factor revises equation (5) as
indicated below:
00
PV(F) = I {[(Wj-1 )(P - E - Aj_1 (L)]/(l + I^" 1 } - X (20)
The value of X is not discounted because it is incurred when Che
policies are written, not at a future date. Similarly, equation (6)
becomes
:
00
(PV(F))/P = I {[(Wj_1 )(l - ER - Aj
" 1 (LR)]/(l + I^" 1 } - XR (21)
The calculation of LR indicated in equation (9) is revised to:
LR^ = [(1 + I-WA)/(1+I)]{[1-ER][(1+I)/(1+I-W)]-XR> (22)
The example illustrated in Section 4, revised to include an additional
new business expense ratio, XR, of 30%, so that total expenses in the
first year for the cohort are 60% of premium, yields a value of LR
of 93.6%. The inclusion of a one time new business expense, as would
be expected, reduces the maximum initial discounted loss ratio from
the previously determined 101.5%.
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MAX
The derivatives of LR under Model 2 can be calculated similarly
to those shown for Model 1. The partial derivative with respect to W
remains positive; the partial derivatives with respect to ER and 1
remain negative. The partial derivative with respect to A becomes:
SLR^/aA = -(W){[(1-ER)/(1+I-W)]-[XR/(1+I)]} (23)
If the expression [XR/(1+I)] exceeded [ ( 1-ER) / ( 1+I-W) ] , then this
derivative would be positive rather than negative. However, for all
realistic values of the parameters, this derivative will remain nega-
tive.
Additionally, the .partial derivative of LR^^X with respect to XR
can be determined. This value is:
SLR^/SXR - -(1+I-WA)/(1+I) (24)
This value is negative, as would be expected.
Section 9 - Model 3
The third model allows for growth (inflation) of expenses and
losses per policy, and premium level increases. Letting the value G
stand for the growth factor, G is the growth rate for the premium
level, G is the growth rate for expenses and G is the growth rate
for losses and loss adjustment expenses. Then equation (5) becomes:
00
PV(F) = I [(Wj ^(PCl+G ) j l - E(l+G ) j 1
3-1 P
- Aj
" 1
L(l+G
1
)
j " 1 ]/(l+I) j l (25)
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If the growth rates on premium, expenses and loss and loss
adjustment expenses are all equal, in the case where the insurer
constantly raises premium levels in line with the growth factor on
losses and expenses, then the expense ratio and loss ratio will not be
affected by inflation and this model will be similar to Model 1. The
MAX
value of LR will not be the same, though, because the premium
volume in subsequent years will reduce from the prior year based on
the renewal rate, W, but increase from the prior year based on the
inflation rate, G . As an example, if the growth rate in premiums,
expenses and losses were a constant 5 percent, then a renewal rate of
90 percent with inflation would generate the same results as a renewal
rate of 94.5 percent (.90 times 1.05) without inflation. However, as
competing insurers will not be making the same rate level adjustments
simultaneously, a higher inflation rate will reduce the renewal rate
as policyholders shop for lower premium levels. Large premium in-
creases, even if justified by increases in losses, will discourage
some insureds from renewing.
If, at another extreme, the growth rate on premiums and expenses
were zero, but the growth rate on losses and LAE were positive, then
the addition of the growth factor would work to increase the loss
ratio on renewal business, offsetting some or all of the decreasing
trend caused by the aging factor. The far more likely situation would
be for the three growth rates to be approximately, but not exactly
equal. For example, if an insurer were evaluating the profitability
of new business in a state that prevented rate increases from fully
reflecting increases in loss costs, then this analysis could be
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perf ornied setting G at a value below that of G, , and solving for the
value of Llt^ to determine if the business should be written at the
allowed rate level. Another situation in which G would be less than
G, is when the insurer grants discounts to long-terra policyholders.
Even if general rate level increases were obtained in line with the
inflation rate on losses, the discounts would work to hold down the
premium level adjustment.
Section 10 - Additional Issues
The aging phenomenon raises a number of additional issues not
covered in detail in this paper. For example, the expense ratio is
treated here as either a constant value over all years or one value
for the first year of business with a lower value for all subsequent
years. This latter pattern may approximate the expenses for direct
writers that pay a straight commission that is lower on renewal
business than on new business. Also, one time expenses associated
with setting up policy files and computer records would be incurred
when the new business is written. However, neither pattern ade-
quately models the expense ratio when the insurer offers a contingent
commission to agents that is a function of the loss ratio. In this
case, the expenses of renewal business would increase proportionately
with the decline in the loss ratio. The exact pattern of the expense
ratio over time would depend on the insurer's contingent commission
plans.
Another issue that arises from the aging phenomenon relates to the
subsidy that occurs from profitable old business to unprofitable new
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business. The aging phenomenon occ\irs most likely as the result of
relevant information that is not known to the insurer when the policy
is first written, but develops over the time while the insurer covers
the risk. Thus, poor risks are given a rate that is actually too low
to reflect their loss likelihood. However, due to the inability to
differentiate accurately the level of risk when the new business is
written, the insurer incurs a loss. However, this loss is later
recouped by overcharging the business that has been with the insurer
for a long period. Many insurers offer some form of discount for
long-term policyholders, either to all or to those with no claims, in
recognition of this improvement in experience. However, the discounts
are not as large as the improvement in loss experience would warrant.
Thus, long-terra policyholders are subsidizing new business, particu-
larly the poor risks that move from insurer to insurer as their true
risk exposure is discovered.
The aging phenomenon also affects the behavior of insurers when
the regulatory regime in a state begins to refuse adequate rate
increases. Typically, insurers put up with this environment for a
considerable period of time before withdrawing from the market. This
apparent patience in the face of inadequate rates is actually reflec-
tive of the profit potential in the existing book of business. If the
insurer withdraws from the market, future renewals on the existing
book of business, which are likely to be quite profitable, are no
longer possible. If the rate levels are not adequate to justify
writing new business, they still may be acceptable for renewal
business. Thus, typical reactions Involve reducing or eliminating new
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business, but continuing to service the existing book of business.
Only when the losses on existing business are such that they are
unlikely to be offset by future profitability on the book of business
does it become economically justifiable to withdraw from the market.
In the models presented in this paper, the renewal rate and the
aging factor were assumed to be constant over the life of the cohort.
These values likely vary in practice, and this variation can easily be
included in the models. The renewal rate is probably lowest on the
first few renewals as those insureds least likely to renew, or be
renewed, lapse. After a few renewal cycles a constant value, somewhat
higher than the early renewal rates, may be achieved. However, for
personal lines especially, the renewal rate is likely to decrease
substantially after a point as the insured faces mortality risk. In
personal lines insurance, the assumption that the insurer can poten-
tially renew policies to infinity is violated.
The constant aging factor used in the current model results in a
loss ratio that tends to zero as a book of business ages. Although
this convergence would require more renewal cycles than actual
policies would experience, this situation represents a potential
problem with this model. One way around this continual decline in
loss ratios is for the aging factor to increase to one after a certain
number of renewals. In this case, no further improvement in the loss
ratio would be expected. Little is known about the true behavior of
the aging factor over time, as insurers justifiably treat this
information as confidential. However, five of the eight insurers
providing information on aging maintain data in a form that allows an
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analysis of this factor over a short period of 'time. For each insurer
the loss ratios (in some cases including loss adjustment expenses)
were provided for a given period broken down by the age of the book of
business. The aging factors were calculated from this information by
dividing the loss ratio for each renewal cycle by the corresponding
ratio for business one period younger. These values are shown in
Table 3. For three of these insurers, Firms A., B and E, the aging
factor is lower initially and then increases. One insurer, Firm D,
has a fairly constant aging factor. The other insurer, Firm C, has an
aging factor that gradually decreases. Thus, no consistent pattern
emerges from this limited analysis. Hopefully, future research can
address this issue. In the meantime, the models can easily be revised
to reflect any pattern of aging factors.
Current insurance accounting conventions ignore the cohort concept
of profitability and aggregate all business together. Thus, premiums,
expenses and losses and LAE do not reflect the experience of an indi-
vidual cohort of business, but the total company operations. If an
insurer has written a constant premium volume for as long a period as
policies could conceivably renew, then the total profitability would
equal the present value of the profitability of any new business
written. However, no such ideal insurer exists. For a typical
insurer growing in exposure count, the aggregate profitability will be
less than the present value of profitability of a cohort approach.
The losses experienced on new business exceed the profitability on
renewal business, as the current new business cohort is larger than
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the previously written cohorts. Future profitability on current
policies is not adequately reflected in aggregate profit statements.
Conversely, for an insurer that is reducing exposure counts,
either in total or for a particular state, the aggregate method of
accounting overstates the profitability of an individual cohort. The
losses on a smaller volume of new business are overweighted by the
profits on long-terra business. Thus, an insurer could be misled to
write additional new business that would actually be unprofitable in
the long run due to the apparent profitability of the total book of
business. Accounting for individual cohorts could avoid the distor-
tions generated by aggregate accounting.
Section 11 - Summary
The aging phenomenon represents an additional dimension of the
insurance equation that is often overlooked in pricing. Insurers
should maintain records by policy cohort in order to determine optimal
pricing levels. The use of aggregate statistics can mislead an
insurer about the true profitability of a book of business. The
effect of higher interest rates on acceptable loss ratios for new
business is complex, since a higher rate lowers the discounted loss
ratio while reducing the impact of future profitability. However, for
short tailed lines, a higher interest rate clearly lowers the accept-
able new business loss ratio if aging is considered. This result
contrasts with the effect assumed if aging is ignored.
Much additional work remains to be done on aging and many issues
must be solved before accurate determinations of acceptable new
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business loss ratios can be made. The models developed in 'this paper
represent simplifications of the actual aging phenomenon in order to
perform initial tests of the effect of aging on insurance pricing.
More information must be collected to determine if renewal and aging
rates are constant, as assumed in these models, or change over time.
Another key issue is the appropriate risk adjusted interest rate, both
for the loss payout patterns of each year as well as for future years'
profitability. Accurate statistics on aging must be compiled in order
to facilitate more in depth research. Hopefully, this paper will
inspire more insurers to collect this information and apply these
techniques.
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Table 1
Illustration of Cohort Experience by Age
Infinite Horizon
Initial Premiums Written: $1,000,000
(000) omitted
Discounted Composite Cumulative
Premium Expense Expense Profit/ Present Present
Year Volume Ratio (%) Ratio (%) (Loss) Value Value
1 1000 30 101.5 (315) (315) (315)
2 900 30 91.4 (193) (175) (490)
3 810 30 82.2 (99) (82) (572)
4 729 30 74.0 (29) (22) (594)
5 656 30 66.6 22 15 (579)
6 590 30 59.9 60 37 (542)
7 531 30 53.9 85 48 (494)
8 478 . 30 48.5 103 53 (441)
9 430 30 43.7 113 53 (388)
10 387 30 39.3 119 50 (338)
11 349 30 35.4 121 47 (291)
12 314 30 31.9 120 42 (249)
13 282 30 28.7 116 37 (212)
14 254 30 25.8 112 33 (179)
15 229 30 23.2 107 28 (151)
16 206 30 20.9 101 24 (127)
17 185 30 18.8 95 21 (106)
18 167 30 16.9 89 18 (88)
19 150 30 15.2 82 15 (73)
20 135 30 13.7 76 12 (61)
21 122 30 12.3 70 10 (51)
22 109 30 11.1 64 9 (42)
23 99 30 10.0 59 7 (35)
24 89 30 9.0 54 6 (29)
25 80 30 8.1 50 5 (24)
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Table 2
Illustration of Cohort Experience by Age
Ten Year Horizon
Initial Premiums Written: $1,000,000
(000) omitted
Discounted Composite Cumulative
Premium Expense Loss Profit/ Present Present
Year Volume Ratio (%) Ratio (%) (Loss) Value Value
1 1000 30 92.17 (222) (222) (222)
2 900 30 82.95 (117) (106) (328)
3 810 30 74.66 (38) (31) (359)
4 729 30 67.19 20 15 (344)
5 656 30 60.47 63 43 (301)
6 590 30 54.43 92 57 (244)
7 531 30 48.98 112 63 (181)
8 478 30 44.08 124 64 (117)
9 430 30 39.68 130 61 (56)
10 387 30 35.71 133 56
Total 297
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Table 3
Aging Factors by Renewal Cycle
Renewal
Cycle Firm A Firm B* Firm C Firm D Firm
1 .90 .80 .89 .95 .86
2 .85 .99 .87 .95 .95
3 1.02 .99 .85 .94 -
4 .89 .91 .83 .96 -
5 .93 1.02 - .95 -
6 .92 .94 - .97 -
7 1.08 .96 - .96 -
8 .95 .98 - - -
9 .93 1.06 - - -
10 1.01 - - - -
11 ,94 — - - -
The aging factors are calculated by dividing the loss ratio (which may
include loss adjustment expenses, depending on the company) for
business of a given age by the same ratio for business one policy terra
previously. For example, the aging factor for the first renewal cycle
is determined by dividing the loss ratio of policies that have been
renewed one time by the new business loss ratio.
*Firra B maintained data on six month renewal cycles. All the other
firms maintained data only on an annual basis.
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